426
White, J., dissenting
for intercity rail passenger service." Instead, after rejecting respondent Boston & Maine Corporation's argument that Amtrak could restore Montrealer service by obtaining track-age rights or an easement, the ICC simply concluded that "Amtrak has demonstrated sufficient reason to justify acquisition of ownership of the line." Id., at 43a.
The majority acknowledges that "the ICC's opinion is not explicit in all of its details," see ante, at 418, but nevertheless concludes that the Commission's reading of the statute is entitled to deference because it "gave effect to the statutory presumption of Amtrak's need for the track, and in so doing implemented and interpreted the statute in a manner that comports with its words and structure." Ibid. But this begs the question of what showing Amtrak must make to establish that the track is "required" so that Amtrak may therefore obtain the benefit of the presumption of need.
The simple fact is that the ICC never addressed this point, and therefore failed to construe a key portion of the statute. The omission is particularly significant because this is the first action treating Amtrak's condemnation powers under § 402(d) of the Act; it will guide future adjudications.
Rather than acknowledging the ICC's omission and remanding for clarification and factfinding, the majority relies on the Government's argument that the Commission must have interpreted the word "required" as meaning "useful or appropriate." Ibid. But this interpretation was not developed by the ICC during its administrative proceedings. Indeed, the explanation was not even proposed in the Commission's argument to the Court of Appeals.2 This ICC
2 This is how the Commission framed its argument to the Court of Appeals:
"Under Chevron [U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)], the Commission had broad discretion to interpret RPSA in this proceeding. This is certainly true with regard to the central issu[e] of determining . . . what must be shown to justify a taking under section 402(d) . . . . As to [this] issue, the statute merely states that Amtrak's need for the property will be presumed unless the transfer will significantly impair the ability of the carrier to carry out its common
Page: Index Previous 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007