Cite as: 503 U. S. 467 (1992)
Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment
tion Clause persist in other aspects of the same system. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U. S. 189, 207 (1973). It would seem especially misguided to place unqualified reliance on the school board's promises in this case, because the two areas of the school system the District Court found still in violation of the Constitution—expenditures and teacher assignments—are two of the Green factors over which DCSS exercises the greatest control.
The obligations of a district court and a school district under its jurisdiction have been clearly articulated in the Court's many desegregation cases. Until the desegregation decree is dissolved under the standards set forth in Dowell, the school board continues to have "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Green, 391 U. S., at 437-438. The duty remains enforceable by the district court without any new proof of a constitutional violation, and the school district has the burden of proving that its actions are eradicating the effects of the former de jure regime. See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 537 (1979); Keyes, 413 U. S., at 208-211; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 26 (1971); Green, 391 U. S., at 439.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, however, retaining jurisdiction does not obligate the district court in all circumstances to maintain active supervision and control, continually ordering reassignment of students. The "duty" of the district court is to guarantee that the school district " 'eliminate[s] the discriminatory effects of the past as well as to bar like discrimination in the future.' " Green, 391 U. S., at 438, n. 4. This obligation requires the court to review school-board actions to ensure that each one "will further rather than delay conversion to a unitary, nonracial nondiscriminatory school system." Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U. S. 450, 459 (1968); see also Dayton Board of Education, 443 U. S., at 538; United States v.
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