Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 16 (1992)

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534

YEE v. ESCONDIDO

Opinion of the Court

tory taking as applied to petitioners' property would be unripe for this reason, see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186-197 (1985), petitioners mount a facial challenge to the ordinance. They allege in this Court that the ordinance does not " 'substantially advance' " a " 'legitimate state interest' " no matter how it is applied. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, supra, at 834; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). As this allegation does not depend on the extent to which petitioners are deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of property or the extent to which these particular petitioners are compensated, petitioners' facial challenge is ripe. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S., at 495; Agins, supra, at 260.

We must also reject respondent's contention that the regulatory taking argument is not properly before us because it was not made below. It is unclear whether petitioners made this argument below: Portions of their complaint and briefing can be read either to argue a regulatory taking or to support their physical taking argument. For the same reason it is equally ambiguous whether the Court of Appeal addressed the issue. Yet petitioners' regulatory taking argument stands in a posture different from their substantive due process claim.

Petitioners unquestionably raised a taking claim in the state courts. The question whether the rent control ordinance took their property without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, is thus properly before us. Once a federal claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 78, n. 2 (1988); Gates, supra, at 219-220; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198 (1899). Petitioners' arguments that the ordinance constitutes a taking in two differ-

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