Cite as: 503 U. S. 569 (1992)
Opinion of the Court
boundary itself is indefinite.11 But uncertainty in cases such as this one surely ends when the State disclaims its sovereignty over accreted submerged lands. The 3-mile boundary remains the same. And in those circumstances in which the Secretary does not require a disclaimer and the 3-mile federal-state boundary extends from the new base line, presumably should there arise any of the federal-state problems Alaska identifies, changes in nautical maps could readily be amended to reflect such changes. Nothing in the parties' lodgings with the Court suggests why fishermen and other sailors who rely on such charts will suffer prejudice by the rule we announce today.12
11 We add that variations between international and federal-state boundaries are not uncommon. As we recognized in United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 165-166 (1965), changes in Convention rules might render the international and federal-state boundaries noncoincident. In the SLA itself, Congress recognized the possibility that variations between international and federal-state boundaries might occur by providing that a decree fixed by our Court "shall not be ambulatory" even though erosion or accretion may alter the international boundary. 43 U. S. C. § 1301(b). We also note that the President's proclamation of a 12-mile territorial sea for international law purposes functionally established a distinction between the international and the federal-state boundaries. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 441, n. 8 (1989). Finally, as the United States accurately points out, some coastal States have created or permitted variations between the international boundary and the federal-state boundaries through compromise agreements reached with the United States. See Mississippi v. United States, 498 U. S. 16 (1990).
12 Alaska also suggests that the regulations at issue in this case conflict with our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), which held that a coastal commission could not condition the granting of a construction permit on the conferring of a public access easement across a landowner's beach. Alaska quotes language in Nollan to the effect that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extortion.' " Id., at 837. This rule, however, has no applicability in a situation such as this one, in which we evaluate the statutory authority underlying an agency's action. Id., at 836. Even were the Nollan situation analogous to that presented here,
589
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