Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 20 (1992)

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626

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY v. OHIO

Opinion of the Court

tion would not be possible without federal approval); International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 133 (1920) (congressional approval of construction of bridge by state-chartered company does not make federal law the source of right to build bridge).16 Congress' use of the same language in § 1323(a) indicates a likely adoption of our prior interpretation of that language. See, e. g., ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 284-285 (1987) (interpreting statute based on previous interpretation of same language in another statute); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Education, 412 U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam) (similarity of language in two statutes "strong indication that [they] should be interpreted pari passu"). The probability is enough to answer Ohio's argument that "arising under Federal law" in § 1323(a) is broad enough to cover provisions of state statutes approved by a federal agency but nevertheless applicable ex proprio vigore.

Since Ohio's argument for treating state-penalty provisions as arising under federal law thus fails, our reading of the last-quoted sentence from § 1323(a) leaves us with an unanswered question and an unresolved tension between closely related statutory provisions. The question is still what Congress could have meant in using a seemingly expansive phrase like "civil penalties arising under Federal law." Perhaps it used it just in case some later amendment might waive the Government's immunity from punitive sanctions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought that liability for such sanctions had somehow been waived already. Perhaps

16 Of course, the phrase "arising under" federal law appears in Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, where it has received a broader construction than in its statutory counterpart. See Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 494-495 (1983). Ohio, however, has offered no reason to believe Congress intended this broader reading rather than the narrower statutory reading. Even assuming an equal likelihood for each intent, our rule requiring a narrow construction of waiver language tips the balance in favor of the narrow reading.

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