648
Stevens, J., dissenting
it observed that it is to be "read into every federal statute of limitation." 2
In this case, even if there was no fraud, and even if it is assumed that the trustee failed to exercise due diligence, it remains true that the parties injured by the trustee's failure to object within the 30-day period are innocent creditors. Moreover, it is apparently undisputed that there was no legitimate basis for the claim of an exemption for the entire award. See ante, at 642. Under these circumstances, unless the debtor could establish some prejudice caused by the trustee's failure to object promptly, I would hold that the filing of a frivolous claim for an exemption is tantamount to fraud for purposes of deciding when the 30-day period begins to run.
II
This, in essence, is also the position adopted by numerous Bankruptcy Courts and three Courts of Appeals.3 Over a period of years, they have held that the failure to make a timely objection is not dispositive, Rule 4003(b) notwithstanding. For example, in In re Hackett, 13 B. R. 755, 756 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1981), the court explained that "[e]quita-2 The tolling of a statute of limitations is not limited to cases of fraud. In medical malpractice suits, for example, this Court has long endorsed the view that the statute of limitations will not bar the claim of one who was "blameless[ly] ignoran[t]" of his injury; rather, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until he has knowledge of his injury. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 170 (1949).
3 Some Bankruptcy Courts, however, have read the statute and Rule narrowly and have refused to examine any exemption in the absence of a timely objection. See, e. g., In re Bradlow, 119 B. R. 330, 331 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SD Fla. 1990); In re Duncan, 107 B. R. 754 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Okla. 1988); In re Payton, 73 B. R. 31, 32 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Tex. 1987); In re Kretzer, 48 B. R. 585, 587 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Nev. 1985); In re Gullickson, 39 B. R. 922 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Wis. 1984). Although the court in In re Hawn, 69 B. R. 567 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Tenn. 1987), took a similar view, it at least recognized that the result might be different if there had been "evidence that the debtor fraudulently or negligently concealed any facts from the trustee or any creditors." Id., at 568.
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