Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 6 (1992)

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Cite as: 503 U. S. 60 (1992)

Opinion of the Court

"[u]nder such statutes, relief may frequently be limited to that which is equitable in nature, with the recipient of federal funds thus retaining the option of terminating such receipt in order to rid itself of an injunction." 911 F. 2d, at 621.4 The court closed by observing it would "proceed with extreme care" to afford compensatory relief absent express provision by Congress or clear direction from this Court. Id., at 622. Accordingly, it held that an action for monetary damages could not be sustained for an alleged intentional violation of Title IX, and affirmed the District Court's ruling to that effect. Ibid.5

Because this opinion conflicts with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, see Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School Dist., 917 F. 2d 779, 787-789 (1990), we granted certiorari, 501 U. S. 1204 (1991). We reverse.

II

In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), the Court held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of action. We have no occasion here to reconsider that decision. Rather, in this case we must decide what remedies are available in a suit brought pursuant to this implied right. As we have often stated, the question of what remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of action is "analytically distinct" from the issue

4 The court also rejected an argument by Franklin that the terms of outright prohibition of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 2000e to 2000e-17, apply by analogy to Title IX's antidiscrimination provision, and that the remedies available under the two statutes should also be the same. 911 F. 2d, at 622. Because Franklin does not pursue this contention here, we need not address whether it has merit.

5 Judge Johnson concurred specially, writing that the result was controlled by Drayden v. Needville Independent School Dist., 642 F. 2d 129 (CA5 1981), and that there was no need to address whether Titles VI and IX are grounded solely in the Spending Clause and whether Title VII analysis should apply to an action under Titles VI or IX. See 911 F. 2d, at 622-623.

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