Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 12 (1992)

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Opinion of the Court

Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the word "induced" applied to the public officeholder, we do not believe the word "induced" necessarily indicates that the transaction must be initiated by the recipient of the bribe. Many of the cases applying the majority rule have concluded that the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all the inducement that the statute requires.16 They conclude that the coercive element is provided by the public office itself. And even the two courts that have adopted an inducement requirement for extortion under color of official right do not require proof that the inducement took the form of a threat or demand. See United States v. O'Grady, 742 F. 2d, at 687; United States v. Aguon, 851 F. 2d, at 1166.17

16 See, e. g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F. 2d 304, 311 (CA7), vacated on other grounds, 484 U. S. 807 (1987), aff'd in part on remand, 840 F. 2d 1343 (CA7), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1035 (1988); United States v. Paschall, 772 F. 2d 68, 72-74 (CA4 1985); United States v. Williams, 621 F. 2d, at 124; United States v. Butler, 618 F. 2d, at 418.

17 Moreover, we note that while the statute does not require that affirmative inducement be proven as a distinct element of the Hobbs Act, there is evidence in the record establishing that petitioner received the money with the understanding that he would use his office to aid the bribe-giver. Petitioner and the agent had several exchanges in which they tried to clarify their understanding with each other. For example, petitioner said to the agent: "I understand both of us are groping . . . for what we need to say to each other. . . . I'm gonna work. Let m[e] tell you I'm gonna work, if you didn't give me but three [thousand dollars], on this, I've promised to help you. I'm gonna work to do that. You understand what I mean. . . . If you gave me six, I'll do exactly what I said I was gonna do for you. If you gave me one, I'll do exactly what I said I was gonna do for you. I wanna' make sure you're clear on that part. So it doesn't really matter. If I promised to help, that's what I'm gonna do." App. 36-37.

Petitioner instructed the agent on the form of the payment ("What you do, is make me out one, ahh, for a thousand. . . . And, and that means we gonna record it and report it and then the rest would be cash"), and agreed with the agent that the payment was being made, not because it was an election year, but because there was a budget to support petitioner's ac-

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