Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 6 (1992)

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30

DENTON v. HERNANDEZ

Opinion of the Court

Ibid. By order dated May 5, 1986, the District Court adopted the recommendation of the Magistrate and dismissed the complaints.

Hernandez appealed the dismissal of three of the five cases (Nos. CIV S-83-0645, CIV S-83-1348, CIV S-85-0084; see n. 1, supra). Reviewing the dismissal de novo, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F. 2d 1421 (1988). In relevant part, Judge Schroeder's lead opinion concluded that a district court could dismiss a complaint as factually frivolous only if the allegations conflicted with judicially noticeable facts, that is, facts " 'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.' " Id., at 1426 (quoting Fed. Rule Evid. 201). In this case, Judge Schroeder wrote, the court could not dismiss Hernandez's claims as frivolous because it was impossible to take judicial notice that none of the alleged rapes occurred. 861 F. 2d, at 1426. Judge Wallace concurred on the ground that Circuit precedent required that Hernandez be given notice that his claims were to be dismissed as frivolous and a chance to amend his complaints to remedy the deficiencies. Id., at 1427. Judge Aldisert dissented. He was of the opinion that the allegations were "the hallucinations of a troubled man," id., at 1440, and that no further amendment could save the complaint, id., at 1439-1440.

We granted petitioners' first petition for a writ of certiorari, 493 U. S. 801 (1989), vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of our intervening decision in Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319 (1989). On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision. 929 F. 2d 1374 (1991). Judge Schroeder modified her original opinion to state that judicial notice was just "one useful standard" for determining factual frivolousness under § 1915(d), but adhered to her position that the case could not be dismissed because no judicially noticeable fact could contradict Hernandez's claims of rape. Id., at

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