Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 33 (1992)

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330

QUILL CORP. v. NORTH DAKOTA

Opinion of White, J.

however, that the Court's opinion can achieve its aims. Certainly our cases now demonstrate two "bright-line" rules for mail-order sellers to follow: Under the physical-presence requirement reaffirmed here, they will not be subjected to use tax collection if they have no physical presence in the taxing State; under the National Geographic rule, mail-order sellers will be subject to use tax collection if they have some presence in the taxing State even if that activity has no relation to the transaction being taxed. See National Geographic, 430 U. S., at 560-562. Between these narrow lines lies the issue of what constitutes the requisite "physical presence" to justify imposition of use tax collection responsibilities.

Instead of confronting this question head on, the majority offers only a cursory analysis of whether Quill's physical presence in North Dakota was sufficient to justify its use tax collection burdens, despite briefing on this point by the State.3 See Brief for Respondent 45-47. North Dakota contends that even should the Court reaffirm the Bellas Hess rule, Quill's physical presence in North Dakota was sufficient to justify application of its use tax collection law. Quill concedes it owns software sent to its North Dakota customers, but suggests that such property is insufficient to justify a finding of nexus. In my view, the question of Quill's actual physical presence is sufficiently close to cast doubt on the majority's confidence that it is propounding a truly "bright-line" rule. Reasonable minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out a "physical pres-3 Instead of remanding for consideration of whether Quill's ownership of software constitutes sufficient physical presence under its new Commerce Clause nexus requirement, the majority concludes as a matter of law that it does not. See ante, at 315, n. 8. In so doing, the majority rebuffs North Dakota's challenge without setting out any clear standard for what meets the Commerce Clause physical-presence nexus standard and without affording the State an opportunity on remand to attempt to develop facts or otherwise to argue that Quill's presence is constitutionally sufficient.

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