Cite as: 504 U. S. 374 (1992)
Opinion of the Court
injunction must be vacated insofar as it restrains the operation of state laws with respect to other matters.
III
We now turn to the question whether enforcement of the NAAG guidelines on fare advertising through a State's general consumer protection laws is pre-empted by the ADA. As we have often observed, "[p]re-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 56-57 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95 (1983). The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly " 'begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.' " Holliday, supra, at 57; Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985).
A
Section 1305(a)(1) expressly pre-empts the States from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier . . . ." For purposes of the present case, the key phrase, obviously, is "relating to." The ordinary meaning of these words is a broad one—"to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with," Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)—and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose. We have repeatedly recognized that in addressing the similarly worded pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), which pre-empts all state laws "insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." We have said, for ex-
383
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