468
Opinion of the Court
below cost in the United States in the hope of expanding their market share sometime in the future. After several years of detailed discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Id., at 577-582. Because the defendants had every incentive not to engage in the alleged conduct which required them to sustain losses for decades with no foreseeable profits, the Court found an "absence of any rational motive to conspire." Id., at 597. In that context, the Court determined that the plaintiffs' theory of predatory pricing made no practical sense, was "speculative," and was not "reasonable." Id., at 588, 590, 593, 595, 597. Accordingly, the Court held that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the plaintiffs and that summary judgment would be appropriate against them unless they came forward with more persuasive evidence to support their theory. Id., at 587-588, 595-598.
The Court's requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims make economic sense did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in antitrust cases. The Court did not hold that if the moving party enunciates any economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is entitled to summary judgment. Matsushita demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision.14 If the plaintiff's theory is eco-14 See, e. g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 248 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgment will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752, 768 (1984) (to survive summary judgment there must be evidence that "reasonably tends to prove" plaintiff's theory); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 288-289 (1968) (defendant meets his burden under Rule 56(c) when he "conclusively show[s] that the facts upon which [the plaintiff] relied to support his allegation were not susceptible of the interpretation which he sought to give them"); Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359, 375 (1927). See also H. L. Hayden
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