Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 26 (1992)

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476

EASTMAN KODAK CO. v. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.

Opinion of the Court

on an accurate assessment of the total cost of equipment, service, and parts over the lifetime of the machine.22

Indeed, respondents have presented evidence that Kodak practices price discrimination by selling parts to customers who service their own equipment, but refusing to sell parts to customers who hire third-party service companies. Companies that have their own service staff are likely to be high-volume users, the same companies for whom it is most likely to be economically worthwhile to acquire the complex information needed for comparative lifecycle pricing.

A second factor undermining Kodak's claim that supracompetitive prices in the service market lead to ruinous losses in equipment sales is the cost to current owners of switching to a different product. See Areeda & Turner ¶ 519a.23 If

the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked in," will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to the number of new purchasers.

Moreover, if the seller can price discriminate between its locked-in customers and potential new customers, this strategy is even more likely to prove profitable. The seller could simply charge new customers below-marginal cost on the equipment and recoup the charges in service, or offer pack-22 See Salop & Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 Rev. Econ. Studies 493 (1977); Salop, Information and Market Structure—Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (1976); Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).

23 A firm can exact leverage whenever other equipment is not a ready substitute. F. Scherer & D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 16-17 (3d ed. 1990).

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