Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 48 (1992)

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498

EASTMAN KODAK CO. v. IMAGE TECHNICAL SERVICES, INC.

Scalia, J., dissenting

manufacturer's particular style of drill press; or the leverage held by an insurance company over its independent sales force that has invested in company-specific paraphernalia; or the leverage held by a mobile home park owner over his tenants, who are unable to transfer their homes to a different park except at great expense, see generally Yee v. Escon-dido, 503 U. S. 519 (1992). Leverage, in the form of circumstantial power, plays a role in each of these relationships; but in none of them is the leverage attributable to the dominant party's market power in any relevant sense. Though that power can plainly work to the injury of certain consumers, it produces only "a brief perturbation in competitive conditions—not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or should worry about." Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F. 2d 228, 236 (CA7 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).

The Court correctly observes that the antitrust laws do not permit even a natural monopolist to project its monopoly power into another market, i. e., to " 'exploi[t] his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.' " Ante, at 480, n. 29 (quoting Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 611 (1953)). However, when a manufacturer uses its control over single-branded parts to acquire influence in single-branded service, the monopoly "leverage" is almost invariably of no practical consequence, because of perfect identity between the consumers in each of the subject aftermarkets (those who need replacement parts for Kodak equipment and those who need servicing of Kodak equipment). When that condition exists, the tie does not permit the manufacturer to project power over a class of consumers distinct from that which it is already able to exploit (and fully) without the inconvenience of the tie. Cf., e. g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L. J. 19, 21-27 (1957).

We have never before accepted the thesis the Court today embraces: that a seller's inherent control over the unique

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