528
Syllabus
guidance in other factual situations, that court has consistently held that heinousness is properly found where, as here, the defendant strangled a conscious victim. Under Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653, it must be presumed that the trial judge in the case at hand was familiar with this body of case law, which, at a minimum, gave the judge "some guidance," id., at 654. This is all that the Eighth Amendment requires. Pp. 535-537. 2. The application of the coldness factor to Sochor constituted Eighth Amendment error that went uncorrected in the State Supreme Court. Pp. 538-541. (a) Sochor's claim that an Eighth Amendment violation occurred when the jury "weighed" the coldness factor is rejected. Because, under Florida law, the jury does not reveal the aggravating factors on which it relies, it cannot be known whether the jury actually relied on the coldness factor here. This Court will not presume that a general verdict rests on a ground that the evidence does not support. Griffin v. United States, 502 U. S. 46, 59-60. P. 538. (b) However, Eighth Amendment error occurred when the trial judge weighed the coldness factor. In Florida, the judge is at least a constituent part of the "sentencer" for Clemons purposes, and there is no doubt that the judge "weighed" the coldness factor in this case. Nor is there any question that the factor was "invalid" for Clemons purposes, since the State Supreme Court found it to be unsupported by the evidence. See Parker, supra, at 311. Pp. 538-539. (c) The State Supreme Court did not cure the Eighth Amendment error. That court generally does not reweigh evidence independently. See, e. g., Parker, supra, at 319. Nor did that court support the death verdict by performing harmless-error analysis, since its opinion fails to mention "harmless error" and expressly refers to the quite different enquiry whether Sochor's sentence was proportional, and since only one of the four cases cited by the court contained explicit harmless-error language. Pp. 539-540. 580 So. 2d 595, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Part I of which was unanimous, Part II of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., Part III-A of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., Part III-B-1 of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., and Parts III-B-2 and IV of which were joined by Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ. O'Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 541. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which White and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 541.
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