Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 20 (1992)

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546

SOCHOR v. FLORIDA

Opinion of Stevens, J.

to avoid the issue and with the Florida Supreme Court in its appraisal of the error.

I

There is no dispute that the instruction prescribing the so-called heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance (or heinousness factor, according to the Court's nomenclature) 2 was unconstitutionally vague under our decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988).3 In Cart-wright, the Court explained that "[t]o say that something is 'especially heinous' merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that the murder is more than just 'heinous,' whatever that means, and an ordinary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially heinous.' " Id., at 364 (citation omitted). Although a state court may adopt a limiting construction of a vague capital sentencing aggravating circumstance to give meaningful guidance to the sentencer, see id., at 360, 365; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 778-779 (1990); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion), or a state appellate court might apply a limiting definition of the aggravating circumstance to the facts presented, see Cartwright, 486 U. S., at 364; Walton, 497 U. S., at 653; Jeffers, 497 U. S., at 778-779; Godfrey, 446 U. S., at 429, the Florida Supreme

2 The trial judge gave the following instruction with respect to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance: "The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following that are established by the evidence. . . . [N]umber three, the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel." App. 326-327.

3 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990) ("It is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that is unconstitutionally vague on its face"); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428 (1980) ("There is nothing in these few words, ['outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,'] standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence").

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