Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 23 (1992)

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Cite as: 504 U. S. 689 (1992)

Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment

from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a wife's action for divorce and alimony. Citing Barber, De la Rama explained the historical reasons that federal courts have not exercised jurisdiction over actions for divorce and alimony. The "common law or equity" limitation the Court now finds so significant was not among those reasons.5 This was so even though the appellate jurisdictional statute at issue there extended to "all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings," 32 Stat. 695, opening the door for the Court easily to have distinguished Barber on the grounds of the "common law or equity" limitation in the diversity statute. Instead, explicitly reaffirming the grounds relied upon in Simms for distinguishing Barber, the Court pointed to the absence of any need to defer to the States' regulation of the area of domestic relations in the context of an appeal from a non-state, territorial court. 201 U. S., at 308.

The third decision is Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U. S. 379 (1930). In Popovici, a Roumanian vice consul was sued by his wife in an Ohio state court for a divorce and alimony. He defended by claiming that the Ohio state court had no jurisdiction to grant the divorce, because federal statutes granted exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts of " 'all suits and proceedings against . . . consuls or vice-consuls' " and " 'all suits against consuls and vice-consuls.' "

5 The Court in De la Rama justified the exception "both by reason of fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value." 201 U. S., at 307. The first reason obviously was discounted by De la Rama itself and is of course untenable today. The second reason can apply only to nonmonetary divorce actions but not to actions for alimony above the amount-in-controversy limitation. The second reason, moreover, was disclaimed by De la Rama itself in joint divorce and alimony actions. Id., at 310. At any rate, in view of De la Rama's explanation, surely the Court is mistaken when it states it "has never addressed the basis" for the domestic relations exception. Ante, at 694.

711

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