Cite as: 504 U. S. 719 (1992)
Scalia, J., dissenting
State plans to prove only elements of circumstantial evidence x, y, and z. Surely counsel for the defendant cannot establish unconstitutional partiality (and hence obtain mandatory recusal) of a juror by getting him to state, on voir dire, that if, in a prosecution for this crime, elements x, y, and z were shown, he would always vote to convict. Such an admission would simply demonstrate that particular juror's standard of judgment regarding how evidence deserves to be weighed— and even though application of that standard will, of a certainty, cause the juror to vote to convict in the case at hand, the juror is not therefore "biased" or "partial" in the constitutionally forbidden sense. So also, it seems to me, with jurors' standards of judgment concerning appropriateness of the death penalty. The fact that a particular juror thinks the death penalty proper whenever capital murder is established does not disqualify him. To be sure, the law governing sentencing verdicts says that a jury may give less than the death penalty in such circumstances, just as, in the hypothetical case I have propounded, the law governing guilt verdicts says that a jury may acquit despite proof of elements x, y, and z. But in neither case does the requirement that a more defense-favorable option be left available to the jury convert into a requirement that all jurors must, on the facts of the case, be amenable to entertaining that option.
A State in which the jury does the sentencing no more violates the due process requirement of impartiality by allowing the seating of jurors who favor the death penalty than does a State with judge-imposed sentencing by permitting the people to elect (or the executive to appoint) judges who favor the death penalty. Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U. S. 563, 583 (1966); United States v. Richards, 737 F. 2d 1307, 1311 (CA4 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Thompson, 483 F. 2d 527, 530-531 (CA3 1973) (Adams, J., dissenting); 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 21.4(b), p. 747 (1984) (adherence to a particular legal principle is not a basis for challenging impar-
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