88
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 747-751 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 264-271 (1984); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). Although the dissenters apparently disagree, see post, at 100 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); post, at 125 (opinion of Thomas, J.), I think it clear that acquittees could not be confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between the nature and purposes of confinement would be absent. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980) (discussing infringements upon liberty unique to commitment to a mental hospital); Jones, supra, at 384-385 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same). Nor would it be permissible to treat all acquittees alike, without regard for their particular crimes. For example, the strong interest in liberty of a person acquitted by reason of insanity but later found sane might well outweigh the governmental interest in detention where the only evidence of dangerousness is that the acquittee committed a nonviolent or relatively minor crime. Cf. Salerno, supra, at 750 (interest in pretrial detention is "overwhelming" where only individuals arrested for "a specific category of extremely serious offenses" are detained and "Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest"). Equal protection principles may set additional limits on the confinement of sane but dangerous acquittees. Although I think it unnecessary to reach equal protection issues on the facts before us, the permissibility of holding an acquittee who is not mentally ill longer than a person convicted of the same crimes could be imprisoned is open to serious question.
The second point to be made about the Court's holding is that it places no new restriction on the States' freedom to determine whether, and to what extent, mental illness should excuse criminal behavior. The Court does not indi-
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