Cite as: 505 U. S. 123 (1992)
Opinion of the Court
burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.12 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
This Court has held time and again: "Regulations which
permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment." Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 648-649 (1984); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Member of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991); Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U. S., at 230. The county offers only one
12 The dissent prefers a remand because there are no lower court findings on the question whether the county plans to base parade fees on hostile crowds. See post, at 142. We disagree. A remand is unnecessary because there is no question that petitioner intends the ordinance to recoup costs that are related to listeners' reaction to the speech. Petitioner readily admits it did not charge for police protection for the 4th of July parades, although they were substantial parades, which required the closing of streets and drew large crowds. Petitioner imposed a fee only when it became necessary to provide security for parade participants from angry crowds opposing their message. Brief for Petitioner 6. The ordinance itself makes plain that the costs at issue are those needed for "necessary and reasonable protection of persons participating in or observing" the speech. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 100. Repayment for police protection is the "[m]ost importan[t]" purpose underlying the ordinance. Brief for Petitioner 6-7.
In this Court, petitioner specifically urges reversal because the lower court has "taken away the right of local government to obtain reimbursement for administration and policing costs which are incurred in protecting those using government property for expression." Id., at 17 (emphasis added). When directly faced with the Court of Appeals' concern about "the enhanced cost associated with policing expressive activity which would generate potentially violent reactions," id., at 36, petitioner responded not by arguing that it did not intend to charge for police protection, but that such a charge was permissible because the ordinance provided a cap. See id., at 36-37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. At no point, in any level of proceedings, has petitioner intimated that it did not construe the ordinance consistent with its language permitting fees to be charged for the cost of police protection from hostile crowds. We find no disputed interpretation of the ordinance necessitating a remand.
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