American Nat. Red Cross v. S. G., 505 U.S. 247, 9 (1992)

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Cite as: 505 U. S. 247 (1992)

Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction, the "sue and be sued" clause would settle the jurisdictional question conclusively, in any case.5

B

These cases support the rule that a congressional charter's "sue and be sued" provision may be read to confer federal court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal courts. In Deveaux, the Court found a "conclusive argument" against finding a jurisdictional grant in the "sue and be sued" clause in the fact that another provision of the same document authorized suits by and against bank officers "in any court of record of the United States, or of [sic] either of them . . . ." See 5 Cranch, at 86. In contrasting these two provisions the Deveaux Court plainly intended to indicate the degree of specificity required for a jurisdictional grant.6 That is certainly how the Osborn Court understood Deveaux, as it described the latter provision as an "express grant of jurisdiction," 9 Wheat., at 818, in contrast to the first Bank charter's "sue and be sued" provision, which, "without men-5 Respondents argue that the parties in D'Oench, Duhme did not litigate the jurisdictional issue. See Brief for Respondents 18-22. But the parties' failure to challenge jurisdiction is irrelevant to the force of our holding on that issue. See, e. g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990) (federal courts have independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction); see also Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 100 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) (giving controlling weight to previous jurisdictional holding by Court even though parties to previous case had not raised jurisdictional issue).

6 The dissent reads Deveaux as distinguishing between these two provisions not on this basis, but rather on the ground that the provision authorizing suits against bank officers allowed the bringing of a particular cause of action. See post, at 270. That reading might be possible if Chief Justice Marshall had not nipped it in the bud. He did not explain the difference between the jurisdictional significance of the two clauses in question by saying that jurisdiction may be granted only in provisions referring to courts in which causes of action could be brought. He explained it simply by inferring, from the drafting contrasts, "the opinion of congress that the right to sue does not imply the right to sue in the courts of the union unless it be expressed." Deveaux, 5 Cranch, at 86 (emphasis added).

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