Cite as: 505 U. S. 277 (1992)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
criminal cases pending on direct review, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 320-328 (1987), but that they generally do not have retroactive application to criminal cases pending on habeas, see Teague, supra, at 305-310 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). We have held that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel on a first direct appeal, see, e. g., Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 355-358 (1963), but that it guarantees no right to counsel on habeas, see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 555 (1987). On direct review, we have announced and enforced the rule that state courts must exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 654-660 (1961). We have also held, however, that claims under Mapp are not cognizable on habeas as long as the state courts have provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate them at trial or on direct review. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489- 496 (1976).
These differences simply reflect the fact that habeas review "entails significant costs." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 126 (1982). Among other things, " '[i]t disturbs the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.' " Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195, 210 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). In various contexts, we have emphasized that these costs, as well as the countervailing benefits, must be taken into consideration in defining the scope of the writ. See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 738-739 (1991) (procedural default); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 490-493 (1991) (abuse of the writ); Teague, supra, at 308-310 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (retroactivity); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S., at 444-455 (opinion of Powell, J.) (successive petitions); Stone v. Powell, supra, at 491-492, n. 31 (cognizability of particular claims).
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