364
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
ley, 473 U. S. 667, 682, 685 (1985). The "miscarriage of justice" exception to this general rule requires a more substantial showing: The defendant must not simply demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result, he must show that the alleged error more likely than not created a manifest miscarriage of justice. This regime makes logical sense. If a defendant cannot show cause and can only show a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome, a federal court should not hear his defaulted, successive, or abusive claim. Only in the "exceptional case" in which a defendant can show that the alleged constitutional error "probably resulted" in the conviction (or sentencing) of one innocent of the offense (or the death sentence) should the court hear the defendant's claim.
The Court today repudiates this established standard of proof and replaces it with a requirement that a defendant "show by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable juror would have found [him] eligible for the death penalty." Ante, at 336 (emphasis supplied). I see no reason to reject the established and well-functioning "probably resulted" standard and impose such a severe burden on the capital defendant. Although we have frequently recognized the State's strong interest in finality, we have never suggested that that interest is sufficient to outweigh the individual's claim to innocence. To the contrary, the "actual innocence" exception itself manifests our recognition that the criminal justice system occasionally errs and that, when it does, finality must yield to justice.
"The function of a standard of proof . . . is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.'. . . The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (1979) (citation omitted). Neither of these considerations
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