Cite as: 505 U. S. 377 (1992)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
Not all content-based regulations are alike; our decisions clearly recognize that some content-based restrictions raise more constitutional questions than others. Although the Court's analysis of content-based regulations cannot be reduced to a simple formula, we have considered a number of factors in determining the validity of such regulations.
First, as suggested above, the scope of protection provided expressive activity depends in part upon its content and character. We have long recognized that when government regulates political speech or "the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance," FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 375-376 (1984), "First Amendment protectio[n] is 'at its zenith,' " Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414, 425 (1988). In comparison, we have recognized that "commercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection," Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 340 (1986), and that "society's interest in protecting [sexually explicit films] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than [its] interest in untrammeled political debate," Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 70; see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). The character of expressive activity also weighs in our consideration of its constitutional status. As we have frequently noted, "[t]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 406 (1989); see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968).
The protection afforded expression turns as well on the context of the regulated speech. We have noted, for example, that "[a]ny assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting . . . [and] must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S., at 617. Similarly, the distinctive character of a university environment, see
429
Page: Index Previous 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007