Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 18 (1992)

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Cite as: 505 U. S. 504 (1992)

Opinion of Stevens, J.

we cannot accept the parties' claim that the 1969 Act did not alter the reach of § 5(b).19

Petitioner next contends that § 5(b), however broadened by the 1969 Act, does not pre-empt common-law actions. He offers two theories for limiting the reach of the amended § 5(b). First, he argues that common-law damages actions do not impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" and that Congress intended only to trump "state statute[s], injunction[s], or executive pronouncement[s]." 20 We disagree; such an analysis is at odds both with the plain words of the 1969 Act and with the general understanding of common-law damages actions. The phrase "[n]o requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in another context, "[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 247 (1959).

Although portions of the legislative history of the 1969 Act suggest that Congress was primarily concerned with positive enactments by States and localities, see S. Rep. No. 91-566, p. 12, the language of the Act plainly reaches beyond such enactments. "We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning." Shaw v.

19 As noted above, the 1965 Act's statement of purpose (§ 2) suggested that Congress was concerned primarily with "regulations"—positive enactments, rather than common-law damages actions. Although the 1969 Act did not amend § 2, we are not persuaded that the retention of that portion of the 1965 Act is a sufficient basis for rejecting the plain meaning of the broad language that Congress added to § 5(b).

20 Brief for Petitioner 20.

521

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