Cite as: 505 U. S. 504 (1992)
Opinion of Blackmun, J.
The plain language of the 1969 Act's modified pre-emption provision simply cannot bear the broad interpretation the plurality would impart to it.
B
Not only does the text of the revised § 5(b) fail clearly or manifestly to require pre-emption of state common-law damages actions, but there is no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to expand the scope of the pre-emption provision when it amended the statute in 1969. The plurality acknowledges the evidence that Congress itself perceived the changes in § 5(b) to be a mere " 'clarifi[cation]' " of the existing narrow pre-emption provision, ante, at 520 (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-566, p. 12 (1969) (hereinafter S. Rep.)), but it dismisses these statements of legislative intent as the " 'views of a subsequent Congress.' " Ante, at 520 (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960)). The plurality is wrong not only as a factual matter—for the statements of the Congress that amended § 5(b) are contemporaneous, not "subsequent," to enactment of the revised pre-emption provision—but as a legal matter, as well. This Court accords "great weight" to an amending Congress' interpretation of the underlying statute. See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381, and n. 8 (1969).
Viewing the revisions to § 5(b) as generally nonsubstantive in nature makes sense. By replacing the word "statement" with the slightly broader term, "requirement," and adding the word "prohibition" to ensure that a State could not do through negative mandate (e. g., banning all cigarette advertising) that which it already was forbidden to do through positive mandate (e. g., mandating particular cautionary statements), Congress sought to "clarif[y]" the existing pre-
539
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