International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 35 (1992)

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706

INTERNATIONAL SOC. FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v. LEE

Kennedy, J., concurring in judgments

in the commercial sphere, the Federal Trade Commission has long held that "it constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice" to make a door-to-door sale without allowing the buyer a 3-day "cooling-off period" during which time he or she may cancel the sale. 16 CFR § 429.1 (1992). All of these measures are based on a recognition that requests for immediate payment of money create a strong potential for fraud or undue pressure, in part because of the lack of time for reflection. As the Court recounts, questionable practices associated with solicitation can include the targeting of vulnerable and easily coerced persons, misrepresentation of the solicitor's cause, and outright theft. Ante, at 684; see also International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163 (NDNY 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981).

Because the Port Authority's solicitation ban is directed at these abusive practices and not at any particular message, idea, or form of speech, the regulation is a content-neutral rule serving a significant government interest. We have held that the content neutrality of a rule must be assessed based on whether it is " 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' " Ward, 491 U. S., at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U. S., at 293) (emphasis in original). It is apparent that the justification for the solicitation ban is unrelated to the content of speech or the identity of the speaker. There can also be no doubt that the prevention of fraud and duress is a significant government interest. The government cannot, of course, prohibit speech for the sole reason that it is concerned the speech may be fraudulent. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 637. But the Port Authority's regulation does not do this. It recognizes that the risk of fraud and duress is intensified by particular conduct, the immediate exchange of money; and it addresses only that conduct. We have recognized that such narrowly drawn regulations are in fact the proper means for addressing

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