Cite as: 505 U. S. 763 (1992)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
general agreement,13 with perhaps the exception of the Second Circuit,14 that secondary meaning need not be established once there is a finding of inherent distinctiveness in order to establish a trade dress violation under § 43(a).
III
Even though the lower courts' expansion of the categories contained in § 43(a) is unsupported by the text of the Act, I am persuaded that it is consistent with the general purposes of the Act. For example, Congressman Lanham, the bill's sponsor, stated: "The purpose of [the Act] is to protect le-13 See, e. g., AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F. 2d 974 (CA11 1986), cert. denied, 481 U. S. 1041 (1987); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S. O. S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F. 2d 604 (CA7 1986); In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F. 2d 1332, 1343 (C. C. P. A. 1982); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F. 2d 695 (CA5 1981), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1126 (1982); see also Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B. R. Others, Inc., 826 F. 2d 837, 843-844 (CA9 1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F. 2d 421, 449, n. 26 (CA4 1986).
14 Consistent with the common-law background of § 43(a), the Second Circuit has said that proof of secondary meaning is required to establish a claim that the defendant has traded on the plaintiff's good will by falsely representing that his goods are those of the plaintiff. See, e. g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (1917). To my knowledge, however, the Second Circuit has not explained why "inherent distinctiveness" is not an appropriate substitute for proof of secondary meaning in a trade dress case. Most of the cases in which the Second Circuit has said that secondary meaning is required did not involve findings of inherent distinctiveness. For example, in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F. 2d 299 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 909 (1982), the product at issue—a velcro belt—was functional and lacked "any distinctive, unique or non-functional mark or feature." 652 F. 2d, at 305. Similarly, in Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F. 2d 971, 977 (1987), the court described functionality as a continuum, and placed the contested rainjacket closer to the functional end than to the distinctive end. Although the court described the lightweight bag in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 754 F. 2d 71 (1985), as having a distinctive appearance and concluded that the District Court's finding of nonfunctionality was not clearly erroneous, id., at 74, it did not explain why secondary meaning was also required in such a case.
781
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