Cite as: 505 U. S. 788 (1992)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
apportionment calculations. Nor did the Solicitor General advance that argument in this litigation.10 As a matter of practice, the President has consistently and faithfully performed the ministerial duty described by Senator Vandenberg. The Court's suggestion today that the statute gives him discretion to do otherwise is plainly incorrect.11
10 While asserting that the President has authority to direct the Secretary's performance of the census, the Solicitor General acknowledged that the statute does not authorize the President to deviate from the Secretary's report: "MR. ROBERTS: The law directs [the President] to apply, of course, a particular mathematical formula to the population figures he receives, but I don't think there is a limit on his exercise of authority to direct the Secretary of Commerce to conduct the census in a particular manner. It would be unlawful, maybe not subject to judicial review, but unlawful just to say, these are the figures, they are right, but I am going to submit a different statement. But he can certainly direct the Secretary in the conduct of the census. "QUESTION: But would he have to remand it in effect to the Secretary or could he say, well, I have had somebody over at the FBI making some checks for me and they tell me there are really more people in Massachusetts, so I am going to give them extra seats. "MR. ROBERTS: I think under the law he is supposed to base his calculation on the figures submitted by the Secretary." Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13.
11 The Court confuses two duties of the President: (1) the general duty to supervise the actions of the Secretary of Commerce, and (2) the statutory duty to transmit the census report and the apportionment calculations to Congress. This confusion is evident from the Court's statement, "It is hard to imagine a purpose for involving the President if he is to be prevented from exercising his accustomed supervisory powers over his executive officers." Ante, at 800. It may be true that the statute does not purport to limit the President's "accustomed supervisory powers" over the Secretary of Commerce. The President would enjoy these "accustomed powers," however, whether or not he was responsible for transmitting the census and apportionment calculations to Congress. These "accustomed powers," therefore, cannot be relevant in deciding whether agency action is final for the purposes of the APA, or else no action of an Executive department would ever be final. The Court's argument then depends on construing the statute to grant discretion to the President that
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