Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 109 (1992)

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938

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN PA. v. CASEY

Opinion of Blackmun, J.

presumptively wrong. Ante, at 918-919. The requirement that women consider this obvious and slanted information for an additional 24 hours contained in these provisions will only influence the woman's decision in improper ways. The vast majority of women will know this information—of the few that do not, it is less likely that their minds will be changed by this information than it will be either by the realization that the State opposes their choice or the need once again to endure abuse and harassment on return to the clinic.9

Except in the case of a medical emergency, § 3206 requires a physician to obtain the informed consent of a parent or guardian before performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor or an incompetent woman. Based on evidence in the record, the District Court concluded that, in order to fulfill the informed-consent requirement, generally accepted medical principles would require an in-person visit by the parent to the facility. 744 F. Supp., at 1382. Although the Court "has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults," the State nevertheless must demonstrate that there is a "significant state interest in conditioning an abortion . . . that is not present in the case of an adult." Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74-75 (emphasis added). The requirement of an in-person visit would carry with it the risk of a delay of several days or possibly weeks, even where the parent is willing to consent. While the State has an interest in encouraging parental involvement in the minor's abortion decision, § 3206 is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest.10

9 Because this information is so widely known, I am confident that a developed record can be made to show that the 24-hour delay, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the restriction] is relevant, . . . will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion." Ante, at 895.

10 The judicial-bypass provision does not cure this violation. Hodgson is distinguishable, since these cases involve more than parental involvement or approval—rather, the Pennsylvania law requires that the parent receive information designed to discourage abortion in a face-to-face meeting with

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