Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 22 (1992)

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124

FARRAR v. HOBBY

Opinion of White, J.

at 436-437; Garland, supra, at 789-790; Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989). Estimating what specific amount would be reasonable in this particular situation is not a matter of general importance on which our guidance is needed. Short of holding that recovery of nominal damages never can support the award of attorney's fees—which, clearly, the majority does not, see ante, at 115—the Court should follow its sensible practice and remand the case for reconsideration of the fee amount. Cf. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542 (1960). Indeed, respondent's counsel all but conceded at oral argument that, assuming the Court found Farrar to be a prevailing party, the question of reasonableness should be addressed on remand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32.

I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, I dissent.

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