Cite as: 506 U. S. 125 (1992)
Stevens, J., dissenting
held in Shaw—though mandating the creation of a "welfare plan" as defined in ERISA4—did not relate to a welfare plan subject to ERISA regulation. Section 2(c)(2) does, and that is the end of the matter. We cannot engraft a two-step analysis onto a one-step statute.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The basic question that this case presents is whether Congress intended to prevent a State from computing workers' compensation benefits on the basis of the entire remuneration of injured employees when a portion of that remuneration is provided by an employee benefit plan. By converting unnecessarily broad dicta interpreting the words "relate to" as used in § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a), into a rule of law, and by underestimating the significance of the exemption of workers' compensation plans from the coverage of the Act, the Court has reached an incorrect conclusion in an unusually important case.
In today's world the typical employee's compensation is not just her take-home pay; it often includes fringe benefits such as vacation pay and health insurance. If an employee loses her job, by reason of either a wrongful discharge or a negligently inflicted physical injury, normal contract or tort principles would allow her to recover damages measured by her entire loss of earnings—including the value of fringe benefits such as health insurance. If I understand the Court's reasoning today, a state statute that merely announced that basic rule of damages law would be pre-empted
4 "Welfare plans" include plans providing "benefits in the event of sickness, accident, [or] disability." § 3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1).
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