18
Opinion of the Court
13-14. We simply hold that compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the Church's appeal.11
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
11 In reaching this conclusion, we reject petitioner's "fall back" argument that even if compliance with a summons enforcement order by the subject of the IRS investigation moots an appeal, compliance by a disinterested third party—here, the Clerk of the Los Angeles Superior Court—does not. Brief for Petitioner 25-34; Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-18. We agree with the Government that a "difference in the method of compliance does not create a distinction for the purpose of the constitutional case or controversy requirement." Brief for United States 30. This case presents a justiciable controversy not because a third party complied with the summons enforcement order, but because petitioner has a stake in the outcome of the proceeding and a federal court can effectuate relief should petitioner prevail on the merits.
There is a distinction in the law between the enforcement of discovery orders directed at parties and the enforcement of discovery orders directed at disinterested third parties, but that distinction derives from concerns regarding finality, not mootness. As a general rule, a district court's order enforcing a discovery request is not a "final order" subject to appellate review. A party that seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (1971). However, under the so-called Perlman doctrine, see Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918), a discovery order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance. Ibid. See generally 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.23, pp. 156-167 (2d ed. 1992). This distinction has no bearing on this case because a district court order enforcing an IRS summons is an appealable final order. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). There is no "third-party exception" because there is no general rule barring immediate appeal of IRS summons enforcement orders.
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Last modified: October 4, 2007