Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 55 (1993)

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Cite as: 506 U. S. 263 (1993)

Stevens, J., dissenting

wise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id., at 101-102.

A footnote carefully left open the question "whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before us." Id., at 102, n. 9 (emphasis added). Neither of our two more recent opinions construing § 1985(3) has answered the question left open in Griffin or has involved the second clause of the statute.14

After holding that the statute did apply to such facts, and that requiring a discriminatory intent would prevent its overapplication, the Griffin Court held that § 1985(3) would be within the constitutional power of Congress if its coverage were limited to constitutional rights secured against private action. The facts in that case identified two such grounds.

14 In Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366 (1979), we held that § 1985(3) does not provide a remedy for a retaliatory discharge that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. We had no occasion to agree or to disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding that conspiracies motivated by an invidious animus against women fall within § 1985(3) because we concluded that the deprivation of the subsequently created Title VII statutory right could not form the basis for a § 1985(3) claim.

Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U. S. 825 (1983), arose out of a labor dispute in which union organizers had assaulted two nonunion employees and vandalized equipment owned by the employer. We held that § 1985(3) did not provide a remedy for two reasons. First, the alleged violation of the First Amendment was insufficient because there was no claim that the State was involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy was to influence state action. Second, we concluded that group action resting on economic or commercial animus, such as animus in favor of or against unionization, did not constitute the kind of class-based discrimination discussed in our opinion in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971). As the introductory paragraph to the opinion made clear, the case involved only the scope of the remedy made available by the first clause of § 1985(3). See 463 U. S., at 827.

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