Cite as: 506 U. S. 263 (1993)
Stevens, J., dissenting
ment of the statute. This description also applies to petitioners, who have conspired to deprive women of their constitutional right to choose an abortion by overwhelming the local police and by blockading clinics with the intended effect of preventing women from exercising a right only they possess. The state hindrance clause thus provides an independent ground for affirmance.37
VIII
In sum, it is irrelevant whether the Court is correct in its assumption that "opposition to abortion" does not necessarily evidence an intent to disfavor women. Many opponents of
37 As part of its crabbed interpretation of the statute, the Court asserts that the scope of the conspiracy is irrelevant in determining whether its activities can be reached by § 1985(3). See ante, at 283-284. This suggestion is contradicted by our prior cases, which have recognized that the magnitude of the conspiratorial undertaking may indeed be relevant in ascertaining whether conduct is actionable under § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U. S., at 98; Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651, 661-662 (1951).
More generally, the Court's comments evidence a renunciation of the effort to construe this civil rights statute in accordance with its intended purpose. In Griffin, Novotny, and Carpenters, our construction of the statute was guided by our understanding of Congress' goals in enacting the Ku Klux Act. Today, the Court departs from this practice and construes § 1985(3) without reference to the "purpose, history, and common understanding of this Civil War Era statute," Novotny, 442 U. S., at 381 (Powell, J., concurring). This represents a sad and unjustified abandonment of a valuable interpretive tradition.
Of course, the Court does not completely reject resort to statutory purpose: The Court does rely on legislative intent in limiting the reach of the statute. The requirement of class-based animus, for example, owes as much to Griffin's analysis of congressional purpose as to the text of § 1985(3). Two Terms ago I noted: "In recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation." West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 112 (1991) (dissenting opinion). Today, the Court selectively employs both approaches to give the statute its narrowest possible construction.
343
Page: Index Previous 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007