462
Syllabus
fied that petitioner's mitigating evidence, including his age, would be given constitutionally adequate consideration in the course of the jury's deliberation on the special issues. Moreover, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605-606 (plurality opinion), expressly embraced the Jurek holding, and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, signaled no retreat from that conclusion. Thus, it is likely that reasonable jurists in 1984 would have found that, under these cases, the Texas statute satisfied the commands of the Eighth Amendment: It permitted Graham to place before the jury whatever mitigating evidence he could show, including his age, while focusing the jury's attention upon what that evidence revealed about his capacity for deliberation and prospects for rehabilitation. Nothing in this Court's post-1984 cases, to the extent they are relevant, would undermine this analysis. Even if Penry, supra, upon which Graham chiefly relies, reasonably could be read to suggest that his mitigating evidence was not adequately considered under the Texas procedures, that does not answer the determinative question under Teague. Pp. 467-477. (c) The new rule that Graham seeks would not fall within either of the Teague exceptions. The first exception plainly has no application here because Graham's rule would neither decriminalize a class of conduct nor prohibit the imposition of capital punishment on a particular class of persons. See Saffle, supra, at 495. The second exception, for watershed rules implicating fundamental fairness and accuracy, is also inapplicable, since denying Graham special jury instructions concerning his mitigating evidence would not seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination in his sentencing proceeding. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 416. Pp. 477-478.
950 F. 2d 1009, affirmed.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 478. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 500. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 504.
Michael E. Tigar argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Jeffrey J. Pokorak.
Charles A. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dan Morales, Attorney General, William C. Zapalac, Assistant Attorney General, Will Pryor, First Assistant At-
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