Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 49 (1993)

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Cite as: 506 U. S. 461 (1993)

Souter, J., dissenting

to [his] mitigating evidence . . . in rendering its sentencing decision." 492 U. S., at 318 (emphasis in original). In Penry, we held that nothing foreclosed such a claim:

"The rule Penry seeks—that when such mitigating evidence is presented, Texas juries must, upon request, be given jury instructions that make it possible for them to give effect to that mitigating evidence in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed—is not a 'new rule' under Teague because it is dictated by Eddings and Lockett. Moreover, in light of the assurances upon which Jurek was based, we conclude that the relief Penry seeks does not 'impos[e] a new obligation' on the State of Texas. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301." Id., at 318-319.

Thus in Penry we held that petitioner sought nothing but the application to his case of the rule announced in Eddings and Lockett, that "a State could not, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigate against imposing the death penalty." 492 U. S., at 318.

The first distinction between Penry's claim and that of Graham is the type of mitigating evidence involved. Penry's went to "mental retardation and abused childhood"; Graham's involves youthfulness, unfortunate background, and traits of decent character. But any assertion that this should make any difference flies in the face of Justice Kennedy's opinion from last Term, quoted before, that "a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts [will only infrequently] yiel[d] a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent." Wright v. West, 505 U. S., at 309 (opinion concurring in judgment). Nor is the second distinction any more material, that Penry's evidence

509

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