Cite as: 507 U. S. 111 (1993)
Scalia, J., concurring in judgment
acter are not embraced within the issues that we granted certiorari to resolve, however, and for that reason, see Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535-538 (1992), we express no opinion concerning the proper construction of that statutory term.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
I am in accord with much of the plurality's reasoning, but cannot join its opinion for two reasons. First, while I agree that the "innocent owner" exception in this case produces the same result as would an "innocent owner" exception to traditional common-law forfeiture (with its relation-back principle), I do not reach that conclusion through the plurality's reading of the phrase "property described in subsection (a)," see ante, at 127-129, which seems to me implausible. Second, I see no proper basis for the plurality's concluding that "respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact that she had no knowledge of the alleged source of Brenna's gift in 1982, when she received it," ante, at 130.
I
The Government's argument in this case has rested on the fundamental misconception that, under the common-law relation-back doctrine, all rights and legal title to the property pass to the United States "at the moment of illegal use." Brief for United States 16. Because the Government believes that the doctrine operates at the time of the illegal act, it finds the term "relation back" to be "something of a misnomer." Ibid. But the name of the doctrine is not wrong; the Government's understanding of it is. It is a doctrine of retroactive vesting of title that operates only upon entry of the judicial order of forfeiture or condemnation: "[T]he decree of condemnation when entered relates back to
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