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Stevens, J., dissenting
pelling" interests, id., at 749, and, in addition, is implemented in a manner that is "carefully limited" and "narrowly focused." Foucha, 504 U. S., at 81.27
27 A comparison of the detention regimes upheld in Salerno and struck down in Foucha is illustrative. In Salerno, we upheld against due process attack provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 which allow a federal court to detain an arrestee before trial if the Government can demonstrate that no release conditions will " 'reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.' " Salerno, 481 U. S., at 741. As we explained in Foucha: "The statute carefully limited the circumstances under which detention could be sought to those involving the most serious of crimes . . . , and was narrowly focused on a particularly acute problem in which the government interests are overwhelming. In addition to first demonstrating probable cause, the Government was required, in a full-blown adversary hearing, to convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person . . . . Furthermore, the duration of confinement under the Act was strictly limited. The arrestee was entitled to a prompt detention hearing and the maximum length of pre-trial detention was limited by the stringent limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." 504 U. S., at 81 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
By contrast, the detention statute we struck down in Foucha was anything but narrowly focused or carefully limited. Under Louisiana law, criminal defendants acquitted by reason of insanity were automatically committed to state psychiatric institutions, regardless of whether they were then insane, and held until they could prove that they were no longer dangerous. Id., at 73. We struck down the law as a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "Unlike the sharply focused scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully limited. Under the state statute, Foucha is not now entitled to an adversary hearing at which the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is demonstrably dangerous to the community. Indeed, the State need prove nothing to justify continued detention, for the statute places the burden on the detainee to prove that he is not dangerous . . . .
. . . . . "It was emphasized in Salerno that the detention we found constitutionally permissible was strictly limited in duration. Here, in contrast,
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