Cite as: 507 U. S. 380 (1993)
Syllabus
(a) Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, not just those caused by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control. This flexible understanding comports with the ordinary meaning of "neglect." It also accords with the underlying policies of Chapter 11 and the bankruptcy rules, which entrust broad equitable powers to the courts in order to ensure the success of a debtor's reorganization. In addition, this view is confirmed by the history of the present bankruptcy rules and is strongly supported by the fact that the phrase "excusable neglect," as used in several of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is understood to be a somewhat "elastic concept." Pp. 387-395. (b) The determination of what sorts of neglect will be considered "excusable" is an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances. These include the first four factors applied in the instant case. However, the Court of Appeals erred in not attributing to respondents the fault of their counsel. Clients may be held accountable for their attorney's acts and omissions. See, e. g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626. Thus, in determining whether respondents' failure to timely file was excusable, the proper focus is upon whether the neglect of respondents and their counsel was excusable. Pp. 395-397. 2. The neglect of respondents' counsel was, under all the circumstances, excusable. As the Court of Appeals found, the lack of any prejudice to the debtor or to the interest of efficient judicial administration, combined with the good faith of respondents and their counsel, weigh strongly in favor of permitting the tardy claim. As for the culpability of respondents' counsel, it is significant that the notice of the bar date in this case was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases. Normally, such a notice would be prominently announced and accompanied by an explanation of its significance, not inconspicuously placed in a notice regarding a creditors' meeting. Pp. 397-399.
943 F. 2d 673, affirmed.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 399.
Craig J. Donaldson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
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