Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 29 (1993)

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408

PIONEER INVESTMENT SERVICES CO. v. BRUNSWICK ASSOCIATES LTD. PARTNERSHIP

O'Connor, J., dissenting

occasion to consider whether the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised its discretion in light of the equities; respondents were ineligible for relief in any event.

The Court's only response is that, even if one focuses exclusively on the nature of the error and why it occurred, the parties can still litigate the Rule's application. Ante, at 395- 396, n. 14. But that objection can be made to any approach; courts always must apply law to facts. The point is that following the plain language of Rule 9006(b)(1) renders the law's application both easier and more certain. A determination that a party missed the filing deadline on account of "indifference" or some other reason is not as "susceptible of litigation," ibid., as the result of multifactor balancing. The determination is factual and, as such, may be overturned on review only if clearly erroneous. In fact, no one—neither the parties nor any of the many courts that have reviewed this case—has suggested that there was clear error here. Rather, in this case, as in most others like it, the Bankruptcy Court's findings are more than adequately supported by the record.

Indeed, the majority succeeds in circumventing the finding of "indifference" only by ignoring it, concentrating instead on other considerations in the multifactor test. The Court's technique will no doubt prove instructive to anyone appealing an excusable neglect determination in the future, for it highlights the indeterminacy of the test: A simple shift in focus from one factor to another—here, from cause to effects—shifts the balance and the result. The approach required by the Rule itself, in contrast, precludes that slippery tactic. At the threshold, there is but one question on which to focus: the reason the deadline was missed. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ibid., that singular focus does not require us to hold today that all incidents of negligence are inexcusable. We need hold only that indifference is inexcusable. That, I would have thought, goes without saying.

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