416
Opinion of the Court
Appeals decision, together with the dramatic growth in the use of newsracks throughout the country,10 prompted our grant of certiorari. 503 U. S. 918 (1992).
II
There is no claim in this case that there is anything unlawful or misleading about the contents of respondents' publications. Moreover, respondents do not challenge their characterization as "commercial speech." Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the city's interest in safety and esthetics. It was, therefore, proper for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to judge the validity of the city's prohibition under the standards we set forth in Central Hudson and Fox.11 It was the city's burden to establish a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests.12
10 We are advised that almost half of the single copy sales of newspapers are now distributed through newsracks. See Brief for American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 2.
11 While the Court of Appeals ultimately applied the standards set forth in Central Hudson and Fox, its analysis at least suggested that those standards might not apply to the type of regulation at issue in this case. For if commercial speech is entitled to "lesser protection" only when the regulation is aimed at either the content of the speech or the particular adverse effects stemming from that content, it would seem to follow that a regulation that is not so directed should be evaluated under the standards applicable to regulations on fully protected speech, not the more lenient standards by which we judge regulations on commercial speech. Because we conclude that Cincinnati's ban on commercial newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson and Fox, we need not decide whether that policy should be subjected to more exacting review.
12 As we stated in Fox: "[W]hile we have insisted that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . . the harmless from the harmful, we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the burden of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 100% complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end. What our
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