Cite as: 507 U. S. 463 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
frey, supra, at 428-429. The terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" describe the defendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude toward his conduct and his victim. The law has long recognized that a defendant's state of mind is not a "subjective" matter, but a fact to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716-717 (1983) (" 'The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove . . . , but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else' " (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885))).
Determining whether a capital defendant killed without feeling or sympathy is undoubtedly more difficult than, for example, determining whether he "was previously convicted of another murder," Idaho Code § 19-2515(g)(1) (1987). But that does not mean that a State cannot, consistent with the Federal Constitution, authorize sentencing judges to make the inquiry and to take their findings into account when deciding whether capital punishment is warranted. This is the import of Walton. In that case we considered Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" circumstance. The Arizona Supreme Court had held that a crime is committed in a "depraved" manner when the perpetrator " 'relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or 'shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure' in the killing." Walton, supra, at 655 (quoting State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 587, 769 P. 2d 1017, 1033 (1989)). We concluded that this construction adequately guided sentencing discretion, even though "the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision." 497 U. S., at 655; accord, Jeffers, 497 U. S., at 777; cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 260 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment) (approving Florida statutory aggravating circumstances that, "although . . . not susceptible of mechanical ap-
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