Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 27 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 463 (1993)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

without "anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions." No such showing has been made.

There is, of course, something distasteful and absurd in the very project of parsing this lexicon of death. But as long as we are in the death business, we shall be in the parsing business as well. Today's majority stretches the bounds of permissible construction past the breaking point. " 'Vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are defined by reference to other vague terms,' " Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S., at 693-694, n. 16 (dissenting opinion), quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F. 2d 1477, 1489 (CA10 1987), nor do sweeping categories become narrow by mere restatement. The Osborn formulation is worthless, and neither common usage, nor legal terminology, nor the Idaho cases support the majority's attempt to salvage it. The statute is simply unconstitutional and Idaho should be busy repairing it.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

489

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