Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 18 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 490 (1993)

Opinion of the Court

Even if we were to endorse the Master's redefinition of a debtor's location, we doubt that his proposal could fulfill its promise "to distribute the funds [more] fairly among the various jurisdictions." Report of Special Master 50. The Master sought to counteract the inequity he perceived in the happenstance that "the larger, publicly-traded, enterprises that generate the lion's share of the securities distributions . . . are by any standard disproportionately incorporated in one state." Id., at 47. His "principal executive offices" initiative, however, cannot survive independent of his erroneous decision to treat the issuers as the relevant "debtors." Because we have already decided that the intermediaries are the proper debtors under the secondary rule, this change would simply transfer the bulk of the disputed funds from Delaware, where many intermediaries are incorporated, to New York, where many intermediaries have located their principal executive offices. A company's arguably arbitrary decision to incorporate in one State bears no less on its business activities than its officers' equally arbitrary decision to locate their principal executive offices in another State. It must be remembered that we refer to a debtor's State of incorporation only when the creditor's last address is unknown or when the creditor's State does not provide for es-cheat. When the creditor's State cannot assert its predominant interest, we detect no inequity in rewarding a State whose laws prove more attractive to firms that wish to incorporate.

Precedent, efficiency, and equity all dictate the rejection of the Master's "principal executive offices" proposal. We accordingly adhere to Texas and Pennsylvania and award the right to escheat under the secondary rule to the State in which the debtor is incorporated.

IV

We turn, finally, to New York's contention that many of the disputed funds need not be escheated under the second-

507

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