Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 14 (1993)

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632

BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON

Opinion of the Court

ation at hand, but to date we have limited its application to claims of nonconstitutional error in federal criminal cases. See, e. g., United States v. Lane, 474 U. S. 438 (1986).

Petitioner asserts that Congress' failure to enact various proposals since Chapman was decided that would have limited the availability of habeas relief amounts to legislative disapproval of application of a less stringent harmless-error standard on collateral review of constitutional error. Only one of these proposals merits discussion here. In 1972, a bill was proposed that would have amended 28 U. S. C. § 2254 to require habeas petitioners to show that " 'a different result would probably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not occurred.' " 118 Cong. Rec. 24936 (1972) (quoting S. 3833, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)). In response, the Attorney General suggested that the above provision be modified to make habeas relief available only where the petitioner " 'suffered a substantial deprivation of his constitutional rights at his trial.' " 118 Cong. Rec. 24939 (1972) (quoting letter from Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 21, 1972)). This language of course parallels the federal harmless-error rule. But neither the Attorney General's suggestion nor the proposed bill itself was ever enacted into law.

As a general matter, we are "reluctant to draw inferences from Congress' failure to act." Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 306 (1988) (citing American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397,

that the test was whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 328 U. S., at 776. Although Congress tinkered with the language of § 391 when it enacted § 2111 in its place in 1949, Congress left untouched the phrase "affect the substantial rights of the parties." Thus, the enactment of § 2111 did not alter the basis for the harmless-error standard announced in Kotteakos. If anything, Congress' deletion of the word "technical," makes § 2111 more amenable to harmless-error review of constitutional violations. Cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509-510, n. 7 (1983).

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