Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 23 (1993)

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Cite as: 507 U. S. 619 (1993)

Stevens, J., concurring

whether the error influenced the jury's deliberations; and leaves considerable latitude for the exercise of judgment by federal courts, I am convinced that our answer is correct. I write separately only to emphasize that the standard is appropriately demanding.

As the Court notes, ante, at 631-632, n. 7, the Kotteakos standard is grounded in the 1919 federal harmless-error statute. Congress had responded to the widespread concern that federal appellate courts had become "impregnable citadels of technicality," Kotteakos, 328 U. S., at 759, by issuing a general command to treat error as harmless unless it "is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights," id., at 760-761. Kotteakos plainly stated that unless an error is merely "technical," the burden of sustaining a verdict by demonstrating that the error was harmless rests on the prosecution.1 A constitutional violation, of course, would never fall in the "technical" category.

Of particular importance, the statutory command requires the reviewing court to evaluate the error in the context of the entire trial record. As the Court explained: "In the final analysis judgment in each case must be influenced by conviction resulting from examination of the proceedings in their entirety, tempered but not governed in any rigid sense of

1 "It is also important to note that the purpose of the bill in its final form was stated authoritatively to be 'to cast upon the party seeking a new trial the burden of showing that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his substantial rights, otherwise they are to be disregarded.' H. R. Rep. No. 913, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1. But that this burden does not extend to all errors appears from the statement which follows immediately. 'The proposed legislation affects only technical errors. If the error is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, the burden of sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding this legislation rest upon the one who claims under it.' Ibid.; Bruno v. United States, [308 U. S. 287, 294 (1939)]; Weiler v. United States, 323 U. S. 606, 611 [(1945)]." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S., at 760-761.

641

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