78
Opinion of Scalia, J.
"the taxation falls upon a service distinct from [import] goods and their value." Washington Stevedoring, supra, at 757. See also Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U. S. 511, 513- 514 (1951).
VI
For the reasons we have stated, we hold that Tennessee's sales tax, as applied to Itel's international container leases, does not violate the Commerce, Import-Export or Supremacy Clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all of the Court's opinion except those sections disposing of the petitioner's "negative" Foreign Commerce Clause and Import-Export Clause arguments (Parts IV and V, respectively). As to those sections, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.
I have previously recorded my view that the Commerce Clause contains no "negative" component, no self-operative prohibition upon the States' regulation of commerce. "The historical record provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce." Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 202-203 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). On stare decisis grounds, however, I will enforce a self-executing, "negative" Commerce Clause in two circumstances: (1) against a state law that facially discriminates against interstate commerce,1 and (2) against a state law that
1 See Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988); Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treas-
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