Cite as: 508 U. S. 83 (1993)
Opinion of the Court
consequences of relitigating the validity of a patent after it has once been held invalid in a fair trial,23 and we noted the danger that the opportunity to relitigate might, as a practical matter, grant monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid patents.24 As this case demonstrates, the Federal Circuit's practice of routinely vacating judgments of validity after finding noninfringement creates a similar potential for relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who are convinced that a patent has been correctly found invalid.
Indeed, as Morton's current predicament illustrates, see supra, at 89, the Federal Circuit's practice injures not only
23 "In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses— productive or otherwise—to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.' Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185 (1952)." 402 U. S., at 329.
24 "In each successive suit the patentee enjoys the statutory presumption of validity, and so may easily put the alleged infringer to his expensive proof. As a consequence, prospective defendants will often decide that paying royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of challenging the patent." Id., at 338.
"The tendency of Triplett to multiply the opportunities for holders of invalid patents to exact licensing agreements or other settlements from alleged infringers must be considered in the context of other decisions of this Court. Although recognizing the patent system's desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the patent as a monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the economic consequences attending other monopolies. A patent yielding returns for a device that fails to meet the congressionally imposed criteria of patentability is anomalous." Id., at 342-343 (footnotes omitted).
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