McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 7 (1993)

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112

McNEIL v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ties must assume the burden of costly and time-consuming litigation.7

We find this argument unpersuasive. In its statutory context, we think the normal interpretation of the word "institute" is synonymous with the words "begin" and "commence." The most natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Every premature filing of an action under the FTCA imposes some burden on the judicial system 8 and on the Department of Justice which must assume the defense of such actions. Although the burden may be slight in an individual case, the statute governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims. The interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best served by adherence to the straightforward statutory command.

7 Prior to 1966, FTCA claimants had the option of filing suit in federal court without first presenting their claims to the appropriate federal agency. Moreover, federal agencies had only limited authority to settle claims. See Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, §§ 403(a), 420, 60 Stat. 843, 845. Because the vast majority of claims ultimately were settled before trial, the Department of Justice proposed that Congress amend the FTCA to "requir[e] all claims to be presented to the appropriate agency for consideration and possible settlement before a court action could be instituted. This procedure would make it possible for the claim first to be considered by the agency whose employee's activity allegedly caused the damage. That agency would have the best information concerning the activity which gave rise to the claim. Since it is the one directly concerned, it can be expected that claims which are found to be meritorious can be settled more quickly without the need for filing suit and possible expensive and time-consuming litigation." S. Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966).

The Senate Judiciary Committee further noted that "the improvements contemplated by [the 1966 amendments] would not only benefit private litigants, but would also be beneficial to the courts, the agencies, and the Department of Justice itself." Id., at 2.

8 Even petitioner concedes that at least one objective of the 1966 amendments to the FTCA was to "reduce unnecessary congestion in the courts." Id., at 4. See Brief for Petitioner 24.

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